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Abstract
There are several reasons underlying the system of punitive damages. 
Application of these reasons to cases yields differing results. The reasons 
fall into two categories: those that support awarding additional damages to 
the plaintiff and those that support extracting more damages from the 
defendant. When the reasons in favor of extraction exceed those in favor of 
award, the award should be split between the plaintiff and a fund. This fund 
should be used to supplement awards when the reasons favoring award 
exceed those favoring extraction. 
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It is difficult on principle to understand why, when the 
sufferer by a tort has been fully compensated for his 
suffering, he should recover anything more. And it is equally 
difficult to understand why, if the tortfeasor is to be punished 
by exemplary damages, they should go to the compensated 
sufferer, and not to the public in whose behalf he is 
punished.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Punitive damages have long puzzled judges and scholars.2 Indeed, 
several states do not permit punitive damages to be awarded at all, except 
where explicitly authorized by statute.3 The standard purpose courts assert 
behind punitive damages is to “punish the defendant for reprehensible 
conduct and to deter him and others from engaging in similar conduct.”4
However, this statement is somewhat cryptic.5 Thus, commentators have 
expounded extensively upon the actual reasons behind punitive damages.6
Several of the commentators agree that there are seven reasons for punitive 
damages, although they disagree somewhat as to what those reasons are.7
The reasons underlying punitive damages can be grouped into two 
categories: those that support extracting more money from the defendant 
and those that support giving the plaintiff more money.
The reasons that support extracting more money from the defendant are 
as follows:
(1) Full Deterrence: If the compensatory award is less than the 
actual cost imposed on the plaintiff,8 then the defendant will be 
under-deterred, thereby necessitating an additional exaction.9 In 
addition, if the defendant has a particularly low marginal utility 
1 Bass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 42 Wis. 654, 672 (1877) (Ryan, C.J., concurring).
2 E.g., id.; Murphy v. Hobbs, 5 P. 119 (Col. 1884).
3
 These states include Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Washington. N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 507:16 (2003); Ciecierski v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 572 So. 2d 834 (La. 1990); Freeman v. World 
Airways, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 841, 844 (D. Ma. 1984); Distinctive Printing & Packaging Co. v. Cox, 443 N.W.2d 
566, 574 (Neb. 1989); Kennewick Educ. Ass’n v. Kennewick Sch. Dist., 666 P.2d 928, 930 (Wa. 1983). The 
extent to which these states allow punitive damages by statute varies.
4
 Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 34 (7th Cir. 1996).
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 34-35; 4-40 DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 40.02[2] (Matthew Bender 2003); Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness 
and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1982)
8
 If the law does not yet recognize a particular type of damage as compensable (e.g., damages caused by pain in 
suffering in the days before that kind of damage was recognized as compensable), then the jury, applying 
principles of common-sense, will still be able to properly impose those damages against the defendant through the 
mechanism of punitive damages.
9 Kemezy, 79 F.3d at 34.
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of wealth,10 then he will be under-deterred by the compensatory 
damages. Thus, when the defendant’s marginal utility of wealth 
is less than average, an additional extraction will be necessary.
(2) Channeling Transactions: We want parties to channel 
transactions through the market when transaction costs are low. 
In a case in which the defendant derives more utility from his tort 
than the plaintiff loses, we would rather have the parties reach an 
agreement in advance, if possible, thereby avoiding a breach of 
the peace and disrespect for the rule of law. This goal can be 
accomplished by adding an additional exaction against the 
defendant so as to make the cost to the defendant at least equal to 
the cost to the plaintiff in any case in which transaction costs 
were low in advance.11 This reason will also serve to strip the 
defendant of all gain.12
(3) Discount: When a tort is concealable, or is otherwise unlikely to 
ever be brought to court, the defendant will be under-deterred by 
compensatory damages alone. Thus, in a suit for such a tort, the 
defendant’s compensatory damages must be multiplied by the 
reciprocal of the probability of detection or litigation for such a 
tort (to account for the defendant’s similar, yet undetected or 
unlitigated, tortious actions).13
(4) Retribution: Sometimes an action will be so abhorrent to 
society (for non-economic reasons), that merely deterring the 
defendant optimally will not be sufficient. In such a case the jury 
will express society’s outrage at the action by adding punitive 
damages.14
10
 This is likely to be the case when the defendant is rich. The declining marginal utility of money is a standard 
assumption of economics. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 869, 913 n.141 (1998). For more on using differential marginal utility of money in assessing 
punitive damages, see Kimberly A. Pace, Recalibrating the Scales of Justice through National Punitive Damage 
Reform, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1573, 1583-85 (1997); but see Polinsky, supra, at 910-914 (arguing that this reason 
should not apply to corporations except in certain situations).
11 Kemezy at 34-35; Polinsky, supra note 10, at 945-46.
12 See Cent. Armature Works, Inc. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 520 F. Supp. 283, 296 (D.D.C. 1980); Brief of 
Amicus Curiae Keith N. Hylton, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (No. 01-1289).
13 Kemezy, 79 F.3d at 35.
14 Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 
YALE L.J. 2071, 2085-86 (1998); c.f. Kemezy, 79 F.3d at 35. For a list of factors relevant to retribution, see 
DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS, supra note 7, at § 40.02[4]. While reasons 1, 2, and 3 are economic in nature, this 
reason is retributive. The economic reasons will often apply in negligence cases by setting damages at the socially 
optimum level. In intentional torts, however, there is rarely a socially optimal amount of the activity. Therefore, 
the economic reasons will rarely apply, and the retributive reason will apply instead. For example, there is no 
socially optimal amount of nose-punching in society (assuming that we disregard any illicit therapeutic gain by 
the tortfeasor). Thus, we cannot seek to deter tortfeasors from nose-punching by imposing a socially desirable cost 
on the act. Thus, the only measure of punitive damages is the outrage that the act engenders in society. Note that 
the retributive reason can sometimes apply even to negligence cases when the economic reasons also apply. This 
can happen when the society decides that certain acts are not tolerable on non-economic grounds. For example, 
torts against life or liberty will be less bound to economics than torts against property. Also, a tortious action that 
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It must be kept in mind that all the above deterrence rationales (reasons 
1, 2, and 3) apply equally to deterring the defendant from future misconduct 
and to deterring other individuals from engaging in similar conduct. It must 
also be kept in mind that the deterrent rationales will be mitigated in cases 
in which the defendant is already sufficiently deterred by factors other than 
the imposition of punitive damages.15
The reasons that support awarding additional money to the plaintiff are 
as follows:
(5) Full Compensation: Because compensatory damages do not 
always cover all the costs imposed upon the plaintiff by a tort, 
punitive damages will sometimes serve to make up the 
shortfall.16 Among the costs underlying this reason are the 
plaintiff’s attorney’s fees, which would not have been incurred 
but for the tort.17
(6) Private Law Enforcement: The promise of punitive damages 
relieves the pressure on the criminal justice system by giving an 
injured party the incentive to bring suit and bring malfeasors to 
justice. In many cases in which the criminal justice system is not 
able to bring such defendants to justice due to strained resources, 
the public will be able to rest knowing that the injured party will 
bring suit in tort, with the promise of punitive damages as the 
reward for serving as a private attorney general.18
(7) Preventing Violence: To the extent that certain types of suits 
would not otherwise be brought, but instead injured parties 
would seek violent extrajudicial remedies (such as revenge by 
retaliation, hiring a “hit man,” or, in the olden days, dueling), the 
promise of punitive damages is needed to channel such disputes 
into the courts.19
These motivations for awarding punitive damages are generally well-
accepted, but what happens when there is a mismatch? If the different 
has a discriminatory effect may engender greater societal outrage than an economically deterrent punitive award 
could express.
15 DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS, supra note 7, at § 40.02[4].
16 Kemezy, 79 F.3d at 34. Damages awarded for this reason are sometimes (properly) referred to as “aggravated 
damages,” rather than “punitive damages.” Irish Law Reform Commission, Report on Aggravated, Exemplary and 
Restitutionary Damages, LRC 60-2000, 79 (2000); James A. Breslo, Comment, Taking the Punitive Damage 
Windfall Away from the Plaintiff: An Analysis, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 1130, 1138-39 (1992 ).
17 Cent. Armature Works, 520 F. Supp. at 296-97; DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS, supra note 7, at § 40.02[2].7, [3]; 
Breslo, supra note 16, at 1136; Junping Han, Student Author, The Constitutionality of Oregon’s Split-Recovery 
Punitive Damages Statute, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 477, 487-88 (2002); cf. Steven R. Salbu, Developing 
Rational Punitive Damage Policies: Beyond the Constitution, 49 FLA. L. REV. 247, 273 (1997).
18 Kemezy, 79 F.3d at 35; Kink v. Combs, 135 N.W.2d 789, 798 (Wis. 1965); DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS, supra
note 7, at § 40.02[2][b][iii].
19 Kemezy, 79 F.3d at 35.
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motivating factors argue for different amounts of punitive damages, which 
factor ought to control?20
If different reasons within the same category argue for different 
amounts,21 then it is not particularly troubling to choose between them. In 
fact, the reasons will typically add together quite nicely.22 However, if the 
reasons from the two categ ories support two very different punitive damage 
awards, then a traditional punitive damage award will generally either 
incorrectly compensate the plaintiff or improperly fine the defendant.
Most strikingly, the mismatch often supports  fining the defendant a 
large amount but only awarding the plaintiff much less.23 The obvious 
solution in this case is to split the punitive damage award (sized to properly 
fine the defendant) between the plaintiff and some other entity (perhaps the 
state). Indeed, several states have so-called split-recovery statutes.24
There may also be a problem in the opposite case, where traditional 
punitive damage doctrine does not support the award of punitive damages at 
all because of a lack of the requisite element of intent.25 In such cases (and 
in cases in which the punitive award is very small because the defendant’s 
conduct is not so outrageous), the plaintiff must bear his own attorney’s 
fees26 and other intangible costs and thus is not fully compensated.
This article proposes a solution to the mismatched punitive damages 
problem. It first focuses on the case of the overly compensated plaintiff by 
having the court analyze the punitive damage factors actually involved and 
distribute only so much to the plaintiff as is proper. It then modifies that 
solution to also solve the case of the under-compensated plaintiff.27 This is 
done by allocating the excess funds from overcompensated plaintiffs to a 
fund to benefit under-compensated plaintiffs.
20
 The only commentator to notice this kind of mismatch (albeit with a different list of reasons) seems to be Dan 
B. Dobbs, Ending Punishment in “Punitive” Damages: Deterrence-Measured Remedies, 40 ALA. L. REV. 831, 
849-53 (1989).
21
 For example, this might happen if the defendant’s behavior is particularly egregious but not concealable, in 
which case reason 4:Retribution will support high punitive damages, while reason 3:Discount will support low 
punitive damages.
22
 Reasons 1:Full Deterrence and 3:Discount will multiply together, while reason 2:Channeling Transactions will 
add on. Reason 4:Retribution will only apply if the product (and/or sum) of reasons 1, 2, and 3 is too small, in 
which case it will serve to add to that amount. On the other side, reason 5:Full Compensation will add to the larger 
of reasons 6:Private Law Enforcement and 7:Preventing Violence.
23 See e.g. Note, An Economic Analysis of the Plaintiff’s Windfall from Punitive Damage Litigation, 105 HARV. L. 
REV. 1900, 1903-04 (1992) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Windfall].
24 See infra Part II.B and Table 1.
25 See Breslo, supra note 16, at 1136.
26
 The so-called “American rule” generally requires each side to bear its own attorney’s fees, but this rule is often 
recognized as too harsh. Thus, there may be situations in which society’s interests in having the suit brought 
demand that the plaintiff’s fees be paid even when the punitive damages are small or nonexistent.
27
 The article will not focus on improperly fined defendants. Jury instructions typically specify that the jury should 
award punitive damages in an amount that the defendant deserves (without specifying any motivation on behalf of 
the plaintiff); Sunstein, supra note 14, at 2081; Clay R. Stevens, Student Author, Split-Recovery: A Constitutional 
Answer to the Punitive Damage Dilemma, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 857, 865 and n.53.
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II. SOLVING THE MISMATCH ONE WAY
A. The Plaintiff’s Windfall
When the defendant deserves a large exaction of punitive damages but 
the plaintiff does not require a comparatively large award, it makes little 
sense to award all the punitive damages to the plaintiff. For example, if the 
defendant committed a tort against a plaintiff and the plaintiff was very 
insulted but also very law-abiding, the plaintiff might not need much 
incentive28 to convince him to bring an action. And if the case is easy 
enough, the costs29 will also be low enough that the plaintiff does not need a 
significant amount of super-compensation in the form of punitive damages. 
However, if the defendant’s action was extremely abhorrent30 (and, for good 
measure, easily concealable31), the case for a punitive exaction from the 
defendant would be particularly high (especially if the plaintiff was much 
poorer than the defendant32).33 Awarding the full amount of damages that 
the defendant deserves to the plaintiff will result in an undue windfall to the 
plaintiff.34 In such a case, it makes more sense to award the excess to the 
state.35
Aside from the undue windfall to the plaintiff not making sense, there 
are three other reasons not to award the full punitive damages to the 
plaintiff when the plaintiff does not require such a large award. First, the 
windfall creates an inefficient allocation of resources.36 Splitting the 
punitive damage award in accordance with the reasons underlying punitive 
damages allows the money to be allocated towards a higher-valued use.37
Second, the windfall encourages plaintiffs to pursue frivolous claims.38
Under the traditional scheme, even when a claim has little merit and a very 
low probability of success, a plaintiff might be induced to bring suit anyway 
because of the prospect of a tremendous punitive damage award. However, 
if the plaintiff knows that his portion of any punitive damage award will be 
limited to what is needed to encourage him to bring a socially desirable 
28 Consistent with reasons 6:Private Law Enforcement and 7:Preventing Violence.
29 Consistent with reason 5:Full Compensation.
30 Consistent with reason 4:Retribution.
31 Consistent with reason 3:Discount.
32 Consistent with reason 1:Full Compensation.
33 For illustrations of this kind of case, see infra Part IV, cases 1 and 2.
34 Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
35 Id. Actually, Justice Rehnquist here suggests that the entire punitive award should go to the state, but he does 
not consider the possibility of a split award. See also Bass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 42 Wis. 654, 672 (1877) 
(Ryan, C.J., concurring).
36
 Stevens, Supra note 27, at 869.
37 See id.; Plaintiff’s Windfall, supra note 23, at 1907 -09.
38
 Han, supra note 17, at 502.
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claim – an amount which is certain to be less than the multi-million or 
billion dollar punitive awards the plaintiff might otherwise imagine – he
will no longer have such a skewed incentive to bring frivolous claims.
Third, the windfall might lead plaintiffs into risk-seeking behavior by 
failing to take appropriate precautions against the torts of others, even when 
the precautions are socially optimal.39
Table 1:
States with Punitive Split-Recovery
State Still in force? What kind? Statute
Alaska Yes 50% of punitive award to state 
general fund
ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(j) 
(Michie 2003)
Colorado No. Repealed in 




1/3 of punitive award to state general 
fund
COLO. REV STAT. § 13-21-
102(4) (1989) (repealed 1995)
Florida No. Repealed in 
1995
60% (later 35%) to either the state 
general fund, or the state Public 
Medical Assistance Trust Fund 
(depending if it is a personal injury / 
wrongful death suit or not)
FLA. STAT. ch. 768.73(2)(b) 
(1986) (repealed 1995), 
quoted in Gordon v. State, 
585 So. 2d 1033, 1035 n.1 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
Georgia Yes Only in products liability cases, 75% 
to state general fund
GA. CODE ANN., § 51-12-
5.1(e)(2) (2002)
Illinois Yes Discretion of judge to apportion 
between plaintiff, attorney, and state 
Dept. of Human Services
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-
1207 (2003)
Indiana Yes 75% of punitive award to state 
Violent Crime Victims 
Compensation Fund
IND. CODE § 34-51-3- 6 
(2003)
Iowa Yes If directed at plaintiff, he gets all, 
otherwise, state Civil Reparations 
Trust Fund gets 75%
IOWA CODE § 668A.1 (2003)
Kansas No. Expired in 1989 50% to state Health Care 
Stabilization Fund, but only in 
medical malpractice cases…
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3402 
(1988) (expired 1989); 1988 
Kan. Sess. Laws 209.1
Missouri Yes 50% of most punitive damages 
awards to a Tort Victims’ 
Compensation fund. Of this, 26% to 
be disbursed annually to legal 
services for low income people fund
MO REV. STAT. § 537.675 
(2003)
New York No. Expired in 1994 20% of all punitive awards to state 
general fund.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8701 
(McKinney Supp. 1994) 
(expired 1994); 1992 N.Y. 
Laws 55 §§ 393, 427(dd)
Oregon Yes 60% to state Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Account
OR. REV. STAT. § 18.540 
(2001)
Pennsylvania Yes 25% of medical malpractice punitive 
awards to state Medical Care 
Availability and Reduction of Error 
Fund
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40 § 
1303.505(e) (2003)
Utah Yes 50% of punitive award above 
$20,000 to state general fund
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-
1(3) (2003)
Ohio Yes By judicial decision. To charity or 
wherever the court wants
---
39 Plaintiff’s Windfall, supra note 23, at 1908; Stevens, supra note 27, at 869.
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B. History of Split Recovery
Beginning in the 1980’s, the thirteen states shown in table 1 passed 
split-recovery statutes for punitive damages.40 These statutes vary in many 
of their provisions. Some are of general application, while others are limited 
to specific kinds of cases (e.g., medical malpractice, products liability). 
They also vary in the percentage of the award left to the plaintiff.41 Some of 
the statutes split the award between the state general fund and the plaintiff, 
while others split the award with a special state fund. Four of these statutes 
have expired or were repealed.42 One of these had been declared to be 
unconstitutional,43 while many others were able to survive constitutional 
challenge.44
All but one of the thirteen statutes apportioned the punitive award so 
that the plaintiff received a fixed ratio of the award (with the remainder 
going to some combination of the state, a special fund, and the attorneys). 
The Illinois statute, however, grants the judge the discretion to apportion the 
award.45 Nevertheless, the statute does not provide much guidance to the 
judge regarding how to apportion the award; it only provides that “the court 
shall consider, among other factors it deems relevant, whether any special 
duty was owed by the defendant to the plaintiff.”46
Up until 2002, split recovery was always accomplished through 
statute.47 However, a recent decision apportioned a punitive damage award 
40
 Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 373 (2003). Pennsylvania 
passed its statute recently, escaping Sharkey’s notice. Act of March 20, 2002, § 505, 2002 Pa. Laws 13.
41
 This percentage varied between 25% and 80%.
42
 The split-recovery statutes in Colorado and Florida were repealed while the statutes in Kansas and New York 
expired. See supra Table 1.
43
 The Colorado Supreme Court declared the Colorado statute to be unconstitutional in 1991. Kirk v. Denver 
Publ’g Co., 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991). The statute was then repealed in 1995. Sharkey, supra note 40, at 373 
n.75. In McBride v. Gen. Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990) a federal district court declared the 
Georgia split-recovery statute to be unconstitutional, but this precedent seems to have been ignored in later cases 
such as Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635 (Ga. 1993).
44 Burke v. Deere & Co., 780 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D. Iowa 1991), rev’d in part on other grounds, 6 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 
1993); Anderson v. State ex rel. C. Bering Sea Fishermen’s Ass’n, 78 P.3d 710 (Alaska 2003); Evans ex rel. 
Kutch v. State, 56 P.3d 1046 (Alaska 2002); Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992); Mack Trucks, 436 
S.E.2d 635; Cheatham v. Pohle, 789 N.E.2d 467 (Ind. 2003); Spaur v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 510 
N.W.2d 854 (Iowa 1994); Shepard Components, Inc. v. Brice Petrides-Donohue & Assocs., 473 N.W.2d 612 
(Iowa 1991); Kan. Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251 (Kan. 1988); Fust v. Attorney General of 
Mo., 947 S.W.2d 424 (Mo. 1997); Tenold v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 873 P.2d 413 (Or. App. 1994).
45 The ABA has also made a similar suggestion. ABA, Report of the ABA Commn. to Improve the Tort Liability 
System 19 (February 1987); ABA Resolution 5(e), 1987 midyear meeting; Robert B. McKay, Rethinking the Tort 
Liability System: A Report from the ABA Action Commission, 32 VILL. L. REV. 1219, 1231 (1987); Janie L. 
Shores, A Suggestion for Limited Tort Reform: Allocation of Punitive Damage Awards to Eliminate Windfalls, 44 
ALA. L. REV. 61, 90 (1992).
46
 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1207 (2003).
47
 One other court did attempt to allocate a punitive damage award, but it was later reversed. Smith v. States Gen. 
Life Ins. Co., No. CV-89-002449 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Dec. 19, 1990), rev'd, 592 So. 2d 1021 (Ala.1992).
In addition, the Alabama Supreme Court at one point established a prospective rule for allocating punitive damage 
awards. Life Ins. Co. of Ga. v. Johnson, 684 So. 2d 685 (Ala. 1996). However, this judgment was vacated by the 
Supreme Court on other grounds. Life Ins. Co. of Ga. v. Johnson, 519 U.S. 923 (1996). On remand, the Alabama 
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via the common law. In Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield,48
the Ohio Supreme Court split a $30 million punitive damage award, by 
apportioning $10 million to the plaintiff and the remainder to the attorneys 
and a new fund to be established in memory of the victim.49 The court 
reasoned that “[t]here is a philosophical void between the reasons we award 
punitive damages and how the damages are distributed.”50 The court took 
notice of the fact that other states split punitive recoveries by statute, but 
noted that since “punitive damages are an outgrowth of the common law. . . 
, Ohio’s courts have a central role to play in the distribution of punitive 
damages.”51 In addition, “those awards making the most significant societal 
statements [are] the most likely candidates for alternative distribution.” In 
order not to dissuade plaintiffs from bringing important claims, however, 
the “distribution of the jury’s award must recognize the efforts the plaintiff 
undertook in bringing about the award and . . . necessary changes that 
society agrees need to be made.”52 This might often be accomplished (at 
least partially) through involving the plaintiff in determining the recipient of 
the award.53
C. A Solution
At first glance, both the Illinois split recovery statute and the Ohio
common law approach seem to solve the problem of the overcompensated 
plaintiff. However, neither approach leaves judges much guidance in 
apportioning the punitive award. Thus, I suggest an approach that provides 
judges with guidance for solving the problem.
The solution must begin by looking at the reasons behind punitive 
damages, identified in section I above. The jury54 will (as is common in 
most jurisdictions) base its punitive damage extraction from the defendant 
on some combination of reasons 1:Full Deterrence, 2:Channeling 
Transactions, 3:Discount, and 4:Retribution.55 The judge56 (after dismissing 
Supreme Court abolished the rule without explanation. Life Ins. Co. of Ga. v. Johnson, 701 So. 2d 524 (Ala. 
1997).
48
 781 N.E.2d 121 (Ohio 2002).
49 Id. at 146.
50 Id. at 145.
51 Id, at 145-146.
52 Id. at 146.
53 Id.
54
 In keeping with traditional common law practice, the jury will decide punitive damages.
55 Currently, the jury instructions rarely make any specific reference to these reasons. However, the instructions 
typically are motivated by concerns expressed by these reasons.
56
 In theory, the jury could make this determination as well. However, that would involve keeping the jury intact 
for a long time. In addition, by putting the responsibility for allocating the award in the hands of the judge, we can 
require the judge to report the reasons behind the allocation, thereby allowing oversight of the system.
M. Ari Behar [Draft-5-11-0410
the jury) should then conduct a separate hearing (bifurcating, or in some 
cases even trifurcating,57 the trial) to determine the punitive assessment.
The judge would then consider reasons 5:Full Compensation, 6:Private 
Law Enforcement, and 7:Preventing Violence in assessing a punitive award 
in favor of the plaintiff. Attorney’s fees under reason 5 will be easy to 
calculate, but because reasons 6 and 7 (and sometimes 5 as well) will 
sometimes be rather difficult to determine precisely, a presumptive amount
(excluding the attorney’s fees) will often be needed. Such a presumptive 
amount must be high enough that it will entice most people to bring a 
socially desirable suit, but it ought not be so high that it catapults the 
plaintiff into wealth. This amount will vary from state to state, and its exact 
determination should be left to the legislature of every state. Even so, the 
amount will differ depending upon the socio-economic class of the plaintiff; 
this cannot be avoided, but the effect may be minimized by considering the 
average plaintiff (likely to be squarely in the center of the middle class). 
Because the amount is merely presumptive, the judge would be free to 
modify that amount if the plaintiff’s wealth differs significantly from that of 
the average plaintiff58 or if the plaintiff has more or less of an intrinsic 
motivation to bring suit.59 Reason 6 will also, in some cases, support 
awarding additional money to the plaintiffs’ attorneys. In any case, there 
need to be guidelines as to how exactly to apportion the award among the 
plaintiff and his attorneys. These guidelines will have to take into 
consideration many sorts of suit – in particular class actions suits.
Finally, any remainder must be put to some public purpose. There are 
several possible recipients of this excess: the state general fund, a special 
state fund, the court system, or charity. The choice of recipients is a matter 
left to the desires of the individual states, but in the absence of specific 
guidelines, the judge might be free to decide upon the recipient as suggested 
by the parties. It must be kept in mind, however, that awarding the excess to 
the state general fund might raise constitutional concerns (see infra part 
V.A) and awarding it to the court system might raise fairness problems by 
57
 Many courts already bifurcate trials with punitive damages. Breslo, supra note 16, at 1148; Pace, supra note 10, 
at 1585; Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and Implications for Reform, 
50 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 178-79 and n.339 (2002); Victor E. Schwartz et al., Reining in Punitive Damages “Run 
Wild”: Proposals for Reform by Courts and Legislatures, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1003, 1018-19 (1999); see 
generally Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Punitive Damages, Due Process, and the Jury, 40 ALA. L. REV. 975, 999-1003 
(1989). This prevents the jury from hearing evidence that may be highly prejudicial to the defendant (such as 
evidence of wealth) until after a finding of liability. Pace, supra note 10, at 1585; Robbennolt, supra, at 178; 
Schwartz, supra, at 1018; see ABA, Report of the ABA Commn. to Improve the Tort Liability System, supra note 
45, at 19; ABA Resolution 5(b)(2), 1987 midyear meeting. In a court which already bifurcates punitive damage 
trials for this reason, the trials would need to be trifurcated in order to apportion the punitive award.
58
 Because of the declining marginal utility of wealth, a richer plaintiff will need a larger amount of money to 
bring suit than a poorer plaintiff even if both require the same amount of abstract incentive.
59
 A plaintiff who is already very likely to bring suit (e.g., a plaintiff who is extremely insulted, yet very law-
abiding) needs less incentive to sue than one who is not likely to bring suit (e.g., a plaintiff who has suffered only 
minimal harm and insult or one who lacks trust in the courts).
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giving the judge too much of an incentive to allocate the award to an under-
budgeted court system.
D. Implementation
Although it is theoretically possible to impose a solution to the problem 
of the overcompensated plaintiff via the common law,60 such a solution 
would not work very effectively. The parties before a typical lawsuit are 
only the plaintiff and the defendant. Neither party has any incentive to ask 
the court to allocate the punitive damage award – the defendant only wants 
the punitive extraction to be small, and the plaintiff only wants his personal 
punitive award to be large – so unless the court acts sua sponte, no punitive 
award will ever be allocated in a non-traditional manner. Courts only act 
sua sponte on occasion, and there is no guarantee that the court will even 
think to apply an alternative allocation on its own. However, a statute on the 
books will make the procedure hard for judges to ignore. They will be 
particularly unlikely to ignore the statute if doing so puts them at risk of 
committing judicial misconduct.61
III. EXTENDING THE SOLUTION
A. Recipient of the Surplus
The above solution does not devote much attention to the recipient of 
the excess portion of the punitive award that does not go to the plaintiff (or 
the attorneys). This is a rather complex matter, however. Several states 
allocate the remainder of the punitive award to the state general fund.62
Other states allocate the remainder to a special state fund, typically 
associated with remedying the harm caused by some sort(s) of torts.63 One 
particular special fund that courts might be tempted to allocate the 
remainder to would be the fund of the judiciary. The common law remedy 
imposed by the Ohio Supreme Court involved setting up a special charity 
fund in the name of the victim. Another possibility would be to allocate the 
remainder to a pre-existing charity.
60Dardinger, 781 N.E.2d at 145-146; Sharkey, supra note 40, at 422 -27; Shores, supra note 45, at 90.
61 This will be an even stronger incentive if removal from office is a possibility.
62
 Alaska, Georgia, and Utah. In addition, Colorado and New York allocated the remainder to the state general 
fund when their split recovery statutes were in effect. Florida also allocated the remainder to the state general fund 
in some cases when its statute was still in effect.
63
 Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, Oregon, and Pennsylvania. While its split recovery statute was still in effect, 
Kansas also did this. And Florida did too in certain cases when its statute was still in effect.
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All of these solutions serve the public benefit and would be consistent 
with the purposes behind punitive damages. Yet, they all pose problems.
Allocating money to the state, particularly when directed at the general 
fund, raises a constitutional question: Is the portion taken by the state an 
excessive fine taken in violation of the eighth amendment? This question 
will be discussed in section V.A. below.
Allocating the remainder to the judiciary’s fund raises a more potent 
issue: Is the judge fit to decide upon the allocation when he may be biased 
towards funding his own courtroom? Furthermore, is the court system even 
fit to decide if the punitive extraction against the defendant is fair when a 
portion of that extraction goes to the courts (with a higher percentage the 
larger the award)? These questions are so potent, that it is unlikely that any 
state would opt for this solution.
Finally, allocating the remainder to charity seems like a good solution, 
but it too has problems. Selecting a pre-existing charity can be difficult, 
particularly if the judge sits on the board of a charity64 or if the preferred 
charity has religious or political ties.65 It can be difficult to choose the 
charity – Should the plaintiff get to pick the charity?66 What if it is a sham? 
What if it bears no relation to the harm found in the case? What if no 
suitable charity can be found? Setting up a new charity presents many of the 
same concerns, and, in addition, the court must administer the charity (by 
appointing an administrator and setting up the bylaws), which may be no 
easy task.
Thus, there are several good possible recipients of the remainder of the 
punitive award. However, they all have some potential problems, and it is 
difficult to choose between them.
B. Matching Surplus to Shortfall
Recall that split recovery only solves the problem of the 
overcompensated plaintiff. It does nothing for the under-compensated 
plaintiff. This suggests a solution to the problem of deciding the recipient of 
the remainder of the punitive award – the recipient should be a special fund 
to help fully compensate the under-compensated plaintiff.
As suggested by reason 5:Full Compensation, the under-compensated 
plaintiff ought to have his costs paid. He also may need additional 
incentives to bring suit, as suggested by reasons 6:Private Law Enforcement
and 7:Preventing Violence. However, the culpability of the defendant may
64
 Dede W. Welles, Note, Charitable Punishment: A Proposal to Award Punitive Damages to Nonprofit 
Organizations, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 203, 207 (1998).
65 Id. at 206.
66 Id. at 206-207
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not be sufficient to impose a punitive extraction large enough to cover all 
these costs. If a fund were established to pay the under-compensated 
plaintiff an amount that would make up for this shortfall, then the goals of 
punitive awards would be better fulfilled. It would only be fitting that the 
surplus from some punitive damage cases be used to fill the shortfall from 
others, making the whole punitive damage system more efficient.
However, it is not clear that the under-compensated plaintiff (as defined 
above) is a common enough occurrence to utilize the entire surplus 
generated by the split recovery.67 It is also not clear why the plaintiff ought 
to be entitled to receive full compensation and incentives when punitive 
damages are extracted, but not when none are extracted (either from lack of 
the requisite level of culpability68 or from lack of the defendant’s ability to 
pay the judgment).
Thus, when a defendant is unable to satisfy the full judgment against 
him (whether it be the punitive extraction or even the compensatory 
damages), the plaintiff ought to be able to recover the shortfall from the 
fund.69 This raises the likelihood that many additional claims would be 
brought against judgment-proof or poor defendants. However, so long as we 
can assure that all these defendants are represented sufficiently by 
counsel,70 this is not a problem. For, why should I be able to sue a rich man 
who chops off my finger for medical expenses but not a poor man who does 
the same?71 The increased litigation will actually solve that additional 
problem. However, it may be difficult to ensure adequate representation for 
all the indigent defendants. Indigent defendants are not provided counsel by 
the state in civil trials. This is usually not a problem, because indigent 
defendants are rarely sued (because they will not be able to pay). However, 
67
 The reverse situation might even be the case. It is possible that the surplus from split recovery will be less than 
the shortfall of the undercompensated plaintiff.
68
 Recall that the typical common law rule is that punitive extractions are only appropriate when the defendant acts 
with gross negligence/recklessness or actual intent.
69
 Thanks to Judge Stephen J. Fortunato of the Rhode Island Superior Court for making this suggestion. See also
Breslo, supra note 16, at 1139 -40; Leo M. Stepanian II, Comment, The Feasibility of Full State Extraction of 
Punitive Damage Awards, 32 DUQ. L. REV. 301, 317-18 (1994).
70
 This is no easy task. The system of public defenders might have to be extended to civil cases in which the 
defendant can show that he is judgment-proof (or nearly so).
71
 One of the purposes of the doctrine of vicarious liability (or respondeat superior) is to solve this problem. See
Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 64-65 (1982). 
However, that doctrine solves the problem imperfectly, because not all poor defendants act in the course of 
employment (and almost none do at all times). Thus, even though the doctrine of vicarious liability is a superior 
solution when it works (because it gives employers an incentive to make sure that its employees are acting 
properly), it is often inapplicable. Because the shortfall recovery approach is unlikely to ever provide claimants 
with the full amount that they request, plaintiffs will still opt to sue employers under vicarious liability when 
possible, thereby ensuring the benefits of that approach. Only when a suit under vicarious liability is not possible 
will plaintiffs sue the poor defendants directly. And even though the defendant will not have to pay the full 
amount of damages, he will still be deterred from acting irresponsibly by the extreme inconvenience of the lawsuit 
and the possibility that he will have to pay what little he has to satisfy a portion of the judgment. Furthermore, 
employers will not be able to argue that they should not be held responsible due to the fund because respondeat 
superior will still be considered the superior doctrine when applicable.
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my solution would increase the number of suits for damages against 
indigent defendants without counsel. Furthermore, the fund will end up 
paying many of the judgments, even if they are made because of a lack of 
an adequate preparation of a defense! This will encourage people to sue 
poor people even when they have no valid claim at the cost of society. 
Nevertheless, if suing a poor person for a frivolous claim is made a criminal 
offense with a strong enough penalty, potential plaintiffs will be deterred 
from bringing these meritless suits, and the system should work correctly. If 
it turns out that the criminal penalty is not an effective deterrent, however, 
the surplus can also be used to hire counsel for defendants in cases in which 
the plaintiff seeks punitive damages.72
 In addition, even if no punitive extraction is made against the plaintiff 
at all, perhaps the judge ought to be able to conduct a hearing to determine 
the amount of punitive award that the plaintiff ought to be entitled to.73 The 
plaintiff would then be able to seek that amount from the fund as well. 
However, this process must be tempered – the cost on the judicial system 
would be rather high if a hearing to determine punitive awards were 
conducted at every single trial at which the plaintiff prevailed (regardless of 
whether there were punitive damages). Thus, a hearing ought only to be 
held if there was significant social value in bringing the suit. The 
determination of significant social value can either be made by the jury on a 
special verdict, or it can be left to the judge.
C. Implementation
In order to implement the above plan to transfer the excess punitive 
damages to higher-valued uses, I propose the establishment of a special 
state agency, called the Punitive Damage Distribution Administration 
(PDDA) to administer the Punitive Damage Distribution Fund (PDDF).
The PDDA would be a judicial agency, with its director appointed by 
the courts. It would consist of a director and several attorneys (in addition to 
clerks and secretaries as needed). If possible within the constraints of the 
state budget, the PDDA should be administered through funds apportioned 
by the legislature, rather than by using funds form the PDDF.74
72
 This proposal might backfire by inducing plaintiffs not to seek punitive damages when suing indigent 
defendants (because then the defendant will not get a free lawyer). However, if the surplus is only used to pay the 
shortfall in a case involving punitive damages, then these 2 conditions combined will ensure that poor defendants 
are only sued when the case is strong enough that the plaintiff is likely to prevail and win punitive damages (even 
with a lawyer provided for the defense).
73
 Since there still may be enough societal value in encouraging the claim for the plaintiff to qualify for costs and 
inducement. There may also still be enough of a threat of violent self-help.
74 This will allow the fund to pay out what is paid in with no overhead. It will also minimize the incentive of the 
PDDA to try to take more than its fair share of punitive awards.
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Whenever a punitive damage verdict is entered against a defendant and 
the defendant loses a motion to remit the award (or chooses not to make 
such a motion), the defendant should be dismissed from further proceedings 
and the PDDA joined as a party. The PDDA would then present evidence 
and argue in favor of a particular distribution of the punitive award,75 while 
the plaintiff would present evidence and argue in favor of retaining all (or 
much) of the award or more.
Any surplus not awarded to the plaintiff would go to the PDDA. Any 
shortfall created by the amount due to the plaintiff being more than the 
amount exacted from the defendant should be certified to the PDDA, so that 
the agency can pay the plaintiff his shortfall (or a portion thereof, if the 
PDDF has insufficient funds to satisfy all such claims).
If the PDDA is able to pay out all of these claims, then it may also pay 
out funds to plaintiffs who are unable to collect their damage awards from 
indigent defendants (as well as those who have managed to avoid payment 
by removing money from the reach of the state’s jurisdiction). If this 
becomes common practice, the PDDA might also decide to provide counsel 
to indigent defendants in punitive damage cases.
IV. EXAMPLES OF THE SOLUTION IN PRACTICE
In order to illustrate the workings of the revised model statute, several 
examples are in order.
Case 1: 
D, a rich tycoon with a tendency towards violence and a dislike of the 
poor, punches P, a poor street-performer, in the face on the street in a run-
down area of town. D was unprovoked and has a tendency to do this often. 
P sustains heavy injuries to his face and incurs $100,000 of medical 
expenses. Very upset, P decides to sue D for battery.76
The jury returns a verdict in favor of P, awarding him $100,000 in 
medical expenses, $100,000 in pain and suffering, and $1,100 in lost pay
for the time that P could not work due to being hospitalized. Thu judge adds 
$1,000 in court costs and fees to that amount. Thus P’s compensatory (and 
equitable) award is $202,100.
75 The PDDA is not the enemy of the plaintiff. Thus, the agency’s attorney should present to the court the fair 
value of the portion of the award he believes the plaintiff and its attorney are entitled to. He should not try to get 
away with as much money as possible, but rather with what the law dictates. Thus, in some cases the distribution 
will not actually be in dispute.
76
 P’s medical insurance company (assuming that P is a rare poor person with medical insurance) probably has a 
lot to do with the decision to sue, but that need not be considered now.
M. Ari Behar [Draft-5-11-0416
The jury also considers an award of punitive damages. Under standard 
principles of the common law, D is subject to punitive damages because he 
committed an intentional tort. Of course, the jury is free to decide how 
much to assess in punitive damages, but they are constrained to only 
consider the appropriate factors (reasons 1-4). The recommended (and 
maximum) jury analysis follows:
Because D has a propensity to go around punching poor people on the 
street and because, let us assume, only 1 in 4 victims77 with comparable 
injuries actually sues,78 the compensatory damages must be multiplied by a 
factor of 4 in order to account for the people who do not sue.79 Furthermore, 
because D is very rich, he places the marginal value of money at, let us 
assume,80 2.5 times the value to the plaintiff. Therefore, the award must be 
multiplied by an additional factor of 2.5 in order to insure that D feels the
full social cost of his actions.81 So, the jury would be justified in assessing 
punitive damages of:
$201,10082 x 4 x 2.5 + $1,000 - $202,10083 = $1,809,900.
Note that only 2 of the 4 reasons for extracting punitive damages have 
been considered. However, the other 2 reasons (reasons 2:Channeling 
Transactions and 4:Retribution) add nothing to the award. Retribution might 
in principle be necessary, but $1.8 million of punitive damages adequately 
expresses the community’s outrage at D’s actions, so no more is needed. 
After the jury has assessed the compensatory and punitive damages, the 
judge should begin stage two of the bifurcated trial. 84 P would present as 
77
 For example, there might be a witness who testifies that he is the defendant's best friend and he has observed 
him punch people on the street on over 50 occasions over the past 15 years. Of these, 25 were poor people, and of 
those about half had serious injuries like the plaintiff. Over the past 15 years, two of the seriously injured poor 
people had sued, and now the plaintiff is the third, so only 3 out of 12 (or 1/4) of similarly situated plaintiffs sue 
(assuming that there is no chance that any of the remaining members of the class is likely to ever sue, perhaps due 
to the expiration of the statute of limitations). Alternatively, a sociologist might testify that there were 
approximately 28,000 such incidents in the past 10 years in this country and that there were 7,000 lawsuits.
78
 When deciding upon the multiplier, it must be noted that there is a problem in categorizing the class of harms 
that should be considered. In general, the solution is to use the narrowest reasonable categorization. Polinsky, 
supra note 10, at 893 -94.
79
 Consistent with reason 3:Discount.
80
 This determination is not easy to make. It is likely that the PDDA will have to call an economist as an expert 
witness to assess the defendant’s marginal value of money (and how that marginal value will vary as the 
extraction increases) in comparison to the average. Of course the defendant would then want to counter with an 
expert witness of his own. Note, however, that this will not always be an issue. Many tortfeasors who are neither 
rich nor poor will marginally value money normally. Expert economic testimony would likely not be needed in 
cases with such defendants.
81
 Consistent with reason 1:Full Deterrence. This can also be conceptualized by saying that although the plaintiff 
might have consented to being punched if the plaintiff had promised him $201,100, the defendant would have 
been willing to pay 2.5 times that amount in order to engage in that activity.
82
 The figure of $201,100 is used here rather than $202,1 00 because the court costs are an equitable remedy rather 
than true compensatory damages, and thus need not be assessed multiple times.
83
 The full compensatory (and equitable) award must be subtracted from the full amount that D should be liable 
for in order to calculate the punitive portion.
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evidence the contract between P and P’s attorney to establish attorney fees. 
We will assume that they signed a standard 1/3 contingency contract. P 
would also present arguments (and possibly expert testimony, but that 
would be unlikely in this case) in favor of paying him more in accordance 
with reasons 6:Private Law Enforcement and 7:Preventing Violence. The 
PDDA, which was joined as a party at the beginning of this stage, would 
then rebut. In this case, it would likely introduce P’s destitute condition to 
argue that not much monetary incentive beyond compensation was 
necessary to induce P to file suit. P’s attorneys would also argue why they 
should get more than they got under their contract.85
The judge should apportion the punitive damages as follows. P should 
get $201,100 / 3 = $67,033.33 to cover the attorney fees that he is liable for 
from his compensatory award. P should also get an additional award for 
bringing the suit. The judge will first consider the presumptive amount 
established by statute. However, because of P’s poor status and 
correspondingly likely low marginal utility of money (together with a 
probable high incentive to sue anyway) the judge would probably modify 
this amount downward somewhat. Assuming a statutory presumptive 
amount of $350,000, the judge might award P $150,000 or so as reward for 
bringing the lawsuit.86
The judge would probably also award the attorneys an additional sum 
because of the societal value of the case and the low probability of success. 
Assume that the attorneys’ actual costs of conducting the suit were 
$25,000.87 Because of the large amount of resources available to D, P’s 
attorneys may have assumed they had only a 1 in 5 chance of winning. 
Therefore, they would need $125,000 to fully convince them to represent P. 
Because they already received money from P, however, the judge should 
award them an additional $125,000 - $67,033.33 = $57,966.67.
The attorneys that represented P in the punitive phase of the trial88
should also get a reasonable hourly wage for their work. Assume that is 
$2,500.89 Therefore, the attorneys get an extra $2,500 from the punitive 
damages.
84
 If the assessment of punitive damages was itself done in a separate phase of the trial, as is done in several states, 
see supra note 57, then this would be stage three of a trifurcated trial.
85
 Note that above, it was probably P’s attorneys that presented the evidence and argument on behalf of P in stage 
2 of the trial. However, it is possible that P hired alternative counsel because of a potential conflict of interest. 
There is little likelihood of such a conflict in this case, however.
86
 It is difficult to explain why this amount is correct. The determination is a highly case-specific endeavor, which 
the judge will make based on his experience and the amount suggested by the legislature. Thus, it is difficult to 
see the basis for this amount in the limited space of this example.
87
 For example: 1 partner at $400/hr x 25 hours = $10,000;
        1 associate at $200/hr x 50 hours = $10,000;
        1 paralegal at $100/hr x 50 hours = $5,000; for a total of $25,000.
88
 Again, these are probably the same as the main attorneys, but they could be different. See supra, note 85.
89
 1 associate at $200/hr x 10 hours + 1 paralegal at $100/hr x 5 hours = $2,500.
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Altogether the punitive award is distributed as follows:
$150,000 + $67,033.33 = $217,033.33 to P
$57,966.67 to P’s attorneys as reward
$2,500 to P’s attorneys for work done in the punitive phase
That leaves $1,532,400 of the punitive award left to go to the PDDF.
Case 2:
One night, D goes around town shooting everyone’s chickens. He 
causes $2,000 damage to each of the 50 chicken farms in town. D is well-
known to everyone in town, and it is quite clear to everyone that D was the 
shooter. The 50 farmers join together to sue D in class action with the 
assistance of the local lawyer. 
The farmers will obviously win $100,000 in compensatory damages 
plus court costs (say $1,000). However, there is little economic basis for 
punitive damages since D’s marginal utility of wealth is typical,90 there are 
no uncompensated costs,91 and the act was not concealable.92 Nevertheless, 
D’s act was extremely abhorrent,93 showing a complete lack of respect for 
the well-being of animals and for the property of others, so there is still a 
strong basis for extracting punitive damages.94
The jury will want to consider the reprehensibility of D’s actions (fairly 
high) as well as D’s wealth95 (neither very high nor very low) in assessing 
the punitive damages. While punitive damages may punish the wrongdoer, 
they ought not to bankrupt him.96 Thus, the jury might impose punitive 
damages on the order of $400,000.
Because the case was so easy, it is unlikely that the lawyer would 
charge a contingency fee. Instead he probably charged the plaintiffs as 
needed. Although this was a simple case, it did involve the management of 
a class, and thus an attorney fee of $10,000 might be reasonable.97 The 
plaintiffs wanted compensation for their losses, and they knew that the cost 
of suing would be rather low, so there is little doubt that the plaintiffs would 
have sued even without any extra incentive.98 Thus, the plaintiffs need only 
receive the attorney fee of $10,000 out of the punitive damages. The lawyer 
90
 Consistent with reason 1:Full Deterrence.
91 Consistent with reason 1:Full Deterrence.
92 Consistent with reason 3:Discount.
93
 Consistent with reason 4:Retribution.
94
 Because D has committed the intentional tort of conversion, he is eligible for punitive damages under the 
common law.
95
 So as to mitigate the damages.
96
 Shores, supra note 45, at 65.
97
 Consistent with reason 5:Full Compensation.
98 Consistent with reasons 6:Private Law Enforcement and 7:Preventing violence.
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himself might possibly deserve an additional award of $10,000 beyond his 
fee, only because he managed the class and instigated the suit (so that he 
would receive $20,000 in total), even though there was very little risk.
Thus, D will pay $100,000 in compensatory damages, $1,000 in court 
costs, and $400,000 in punitive damages, for a total of $501,000. At the end 
of the day, each plaintiff will take home $2,000 in compensatory damages, 
and the lawyer will take $20,000, with $1,000 going to the court. The 
remaining $380,000 will go to the PDDF.
Case 3:
D, an inexperienced teenage driver, wants to look “cool” to his friends 
so he drives at 75 MPH in a 25 MPH zone. This causes an accident in which 
D himself is seriously injured. Bystanders P and Q are also slightly injured. 
P and Q have very little incentive to sue P because they know that the suit 
will be expensive, compared to their minor injuries totaling $2,000 in
medical expenses. Nevertheless, believing that they might get punitive 
damages, they decide to sue.
The jury will clearly find D liable for $2,000 in compensatory damages 
and, say $500 in court costs. However, there is little reason to assess 
punitive damages against him.99 The tort may be slightly concealable, and 
some plaintiffs would choose not to sue. And the act was reprehensible, but 
the reprehensibility is mitigated by the childish desire to look “cool” and the 
punishment D has already suffered by his own injury. Thus, a jury might 
award something like $2,000 in punitive damages. D would then have to 
pay a total of $5,000.
However, P and Q incurred, let us assume, $2,000 in attorney fees. In 
addition, there is a strong social benefit to bringing suits against reckless 
teenage drivers, so as to ensure that other teenage drivers are deterred from 
driving recklessly. The court will likely find that the plaintiffs need an 
additional $20,000 as retroactive encouragement to bring suit. Thus, in 
addition to the $2,000 in compensatory damages, the plaintiffs are entitled 
to $22,000 in punitive damages.100
Since $22,000 exceeds the $2,000 punitive damage extraction, the judge 
will certify the excess of $20,000 to the PDDA. P and Q will then make a 
claim before the PDDA for their $20,000 shortfall. If the PDDF has enough 
99
 Note that punitive damages are available under the common law because driving at three times the speed limit is 
reckless and grossly negligent.
100
 $22,000 = $20,000 (enticement) + $2,000 (attorney fees)
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funds,101 it will pay it to them immediately. Otherwise, it will determine 
how much it can afford to pay and pay them that amount.102
Case 4:
Consider the facts of BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore.103 In that 
case a BMW dealership repainted a new car before selling it. Upon the sale, 
the dealer did not notify the buyer of the repainting, contrary to Alabama’s 
fraud law.104 The buyer did not notice any flaws until notified of evidence 
of repainting by an independent detailer 9 months later.105 The jury awarded 
$4,000 in compensatory damages.106 Based on evidence that BMW had 
engaged in similar conduct 983 times in the United States, the jury awarded 
$4 million in punitive damages,107 which the Alabama Supreme Court 
reduced to $2 million. 
In this case, there does not seem to be any evidence that the 
compensatory damages were any less than the full cost imposed on the 
plaintiff. Therefore reason 1:Full Deterrence does not apply.108 There is also 
no evidence to support application of reason 2:Channeling Transactions.
There is, however, a basis for applying reason 3:Discount. Indeed, the 
plaintiff did not discover the damage for quite some time in this case. 
Nevertheless, as the U.S. Supreme Court noted, it would violate due process 
for the state of Alabama to impose punitive damages based on conduct that 
occurred beyond the state’s jurisdiction.109 Thus, instead of multiplying the 
compensatory damages by 1000 (or 983), the jury should have multiplied 
by a factor 14, because the evidence reflected 14 other cases of paint-fraud 
by BMW in the state (and none by any other company). Therefore, an 
appropriate punitive damage exaction would be:
$4,000 x 14 - $4,000 = $52,000.
There might be a basis for applying reason 4:Retribution, but it is weak. 
Certainly BMW’s actions were not particularly outrageous. Thus, it is clear 
that $4 million (or even $2 million) would be excessive. However, it is not 
clear if $52,000 is enough of an expression of community outrage, although 
it might be. I could see a reasonable jury imposing a punitive exaction of 
101
 Keep in mind that this kind of claim (a punitive shortfall) receives the highest priority. Thus, this claim will be 
paid in full before the PDDA begins paying any claims to plaintiffs who cannot collect against judgment-proof 
defendants or attorney fees to tort parties when no punitive damages are levied.
102
 This will depend on the procedures that the PDDA has established. It is possible that the PDDA will choose to 
pay the plaintiffs with an annuity or in several installments so as to be able to pay the entire amount.
103
 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
104 Id. at 563.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 565.
107 Id. at 564-65.
108
 Even if BMW is richer than the plaintiff, as a corporation it is likely that the principle of declining utility of 
wealth does not apply to its decisions.
109 BMW, 517 U.S. at 572.
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maybe up to $500,000, but I could also see the jury as being content with
mere $52,000. This determination must be made by a jury, with the 
guidance of the judge and the state legislature.
Once the punitive exaction is determined, the court ought to focus on 
the distribution of the award. First, the judge should pay the attorney’s fees 
from the punitive award. After that, the judge should look to reasons 
6:Private Law Enforcement and 7:Preventing Violence. Reason 7 does not 
seem to apply in this case. Reason 6 might apply to the extent that the state 
has an interest in bringing defendants like BMW to justice for conduct like 
repainting cars. The state undoubtedly has some interest in doing so, but it 
does not have a very large interest. I doubt that the state has more than, say 
a $100,000 interest in doing so (and it may even be less). Thus, if the jury 
properly awarded $500,000 in punitive damages, the court should award the 
plaintiff its attorney’s fees plus up to $100,000, with any remainder going to 
the PDDF.
V. PROBLEMS AND ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Constitutional Considerations
This proposal is subject to many of the same constitutional questions 
that surround other split recovery statutes. Nevertheless, it has been 
constructed so that all of these concerns are minimized, if not eliminated.
1. Takings clause110
The only decision to permanently strike down a split-recovery statute as 
unconstitutional was one which struck down the Colorado statute on the 
basis of the takings clause.111 Thus this issue deserves special attention.
Unlike compensatory damages, there is no inherent right to collect 
punitive damages.112 Thus, a plaintiff has no vested right in a punitive 
110
 The Takings clause provides that “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
111 Kirk v. Denver Publ’g Co., 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991).
112 Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 39 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); Gordon v. State, 608 So. 
2d 800, 801 (Fla. 1992); Shepherd Components, Inc. v. Brice Petrides-Donohue & Assocs., 473 N.W.2d 612, 619 
(Iowa 1991); Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657, 662 (Iowa 1971); DeMendoza v. Huffman, 51 P.3d 1232, 1242, 
1245 (Or. 2003); Scott Dodson, Note, Assessing the Practicality and Constitutionality of Alaska’s Split-Recovery 
Punitive Damages Statute, 49 DUKE L.J. 1335, 1364 (2000); E. Jeffrey Grube, Note, Punitive Damages: A 
Misplaced Remedy, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 839, 850-51 (1993); Stevens, supra note 27, at 874; Welles, supra note 
64, at 208.
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damage award until a final judgment is rendered.113 Therefore, as long as 
the statute specifies that the punitive damages are assessed against the 
defendant and the plaintiff is entitled to only so much of the award as the 
court deems appropriate, there should be no takings clause problem. In the 
Colorado decision the state interest in the award only came into being upon 
the judgment becoming payable;114 however, my proposal provides for the 
state to become interested in the award in a special phase of the trial to 
determine the distribution. In effect, the state will have had a potential 
interest in the award all along, but that interest will only mature upon entry 
of judgment.115 116 Indeed, numerous other courts have not found takings 
problems with other state split-recovery statutes, leading to the conclusion 
that the Kirk decision was an aberration, perhaps caused by the unique 
language of the Colorado statute.117
2. Substantive due process
Substantive due process presents no challenge to the proposal. 
Substantive due process protects individuals against laws that deprive them
of property without having any rational basis in furthering a legitimate state 
interest. The plaintiff has no vested property interest in a punitive damage 
award prior to final judgment.118 Even if this were not the case, however, 
there is clearly a rational basis for eliminating the plaintiff’s windfall.119
The proposal is particularly unlikely to be found to abridge the plaintiff’s 
substantive due process rights because “legislative Acts adjusting the 
burdens and benefits of economic life come to the Court with a presumption 
of constitutionality, and . . . the burden is on one complaining of a due 
process violation to establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary 
and irrational way.”120
The defendant, however, may complain of substantive due process. If a 
punitive damage award is “grossly excessive,” then it is unconstitutional via 
113 Gordon, 608 So. 2d at 801; Dodson, supra note 112, at 1364; Sharkey, supra note 40, at 436; Stevens, supra
note 27, at 874; Welles, supra note 64, at 208.
114
 Matthew J. Klaben, Note, Split Recovery Statutes: The Interplay of the Takings and Excessive Fines Clauses, 
80 CORNELL L. REV. 104, 124 (1994). In fact, the Colorado statute explicitly disclaimed any state interest in the 
award prior to being due. Id.
115
 This also allows the statute to avoid an excessive fine challenge, since the state exercises no control over its 
interest until after the final judgment. See Lynda A. Sloane, Note, The Split Award Statute: A Move Toward 
Effectuating the True Purpose of Punitive Damages, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 473, 508 (1993).
116
 Another way to eliminate a takings challenge would be to have the defendant pay the entire punitive damage 
award to the clerk of the court, who would then distribute the award as directed by the judge. Stepanian, supra
note 69, at 316.
117
 Sharkey, supra note 40, at 436 -37.
118 Supra note 113.
119 Supra part II.A.
120
 Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976).
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substantive due process.121 However, the proposed statute is no more likely 
to run afoul of this requirement than a traditional punitive damage scheme. 
3. Procedural due process
Like substantive due process, procedural due process only protects 
vested property interests. Since the plaintiff has no vested property interest 
in a punitive award until final judgment is rendered, the proposed statute 
poses no procedural due process problem on behalf of the plaintiff.122 Even 
were this not the case, procedural due process only requires notice and an 
opportunity to be heard by the party deprived of a property right.123 The 
hearing on the apportionment of the punitive damages will satisfy this 
requirement.
The defendant may also complain of procedural due process. However, 
so long as the government does not intervene in the trial until after the 
verdict against the defendant is issued and ruled upon by the judge, there 
can be no basis for the defendant to complain that the decision against him 
was not fair.
4. Excessive fines
In 1989, the Supreme Court ruled that the Excessive Fines Clause of the 
eighth amendment does not apply to punitive damages. The court relied 
heavily on the fact that the damages were solely between two private 
parties.124 This suggests casts doubt upon the status of split-recovery awards 
taken by the state.125 However, the majority opinion does note that “the 
Excessive Fines Clause was intended to limit only those fines directly 
imposed by, and payable to, the government.”126 Thus, the excessive fines 
clause may only apply when the government both receives a portion of the 
award and directly imposes it. In any case, the model statute protects 
against government involvement in the imposition of the award by not 
allowing the government to intervene until after a final decision has been 
reached on the damages assessed against the plaintiff. It also protects 
against the Excessive Fines Clause by awarding the public portion of the 
award to a special state fund, rather than to the state general fund.127
121 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 
(1996).
122 See supra note 113.
123
 Han, supra note 17, at 512.
124 Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 298 (1989) (O’Connor & Stevens, JJ., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
125 Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 298-99 (O’Connor & Stevens, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
126 Id. at 268 (emphasis added).
127 Cf. Sharkey, supra note 40, at 435.
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Whether or not the excessive fines clause applies to split-recovery 
awards is no longer an important question, however. For even if the clause 
does apply, it only prohibits fines that are excessive. The Supreme Court 
already prohibits all punitive damage awards from being excessive, under 
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore.128 Therefore, excessiveness analysis 
must be applied regardless of whether the excessive fines clause applies, so 
that clause has now become irrelevant to the discussion.129
5. Common law re-examination clause
The Seventh Amendment provides that “no fact tried by a jury, shall be 
otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to 
the rules of the common law.”130 It might be argued that for the court to 
reexamine the jury’s assessment of punitive damages in a manner unheard 
of by the common law at the time of the adoption of the Seventh 
Amendment violates that amendment. However, the only “fact tried by” the 
jury under the proposed statute is the amount that is to be assessed against 
the defendant. Therefore, the judge is free to apportion that award as he sees 
fit without disturbing the jury’s verdict.131
B. Empirical Concerns
An empirical concern with the proposal is that it is unclear if the 
numbers will match up. Although it seems likely that the problem of the 
overcompensated plaintiff will produce more dollars going into the PDDF 
than the problem of the under-compensated plaintiff will take out of the 
fund, there is no empirical evidence for this result. It may be that more 
money is claimed from the fund (even by just paying the under-
compensated plaintiffs) than the fund can supply. On the other hand, the 
fund may supply more than is needed to satisfy all claims by under-
compensated plaintiffs. In that case, claims would be entertained by the 
PDDA for plaintiffs who are unable to collect their awards and for plaintiffs 
who deserve punitive awards when defendants do not qualify. However, it 
is almost certain that the fund would be unable to satisfy all such claims in 
their entirety. However, that situation would still be better than the situation 
today, when there is no chance for plaintiffs to recover in many situations.
128 517 U.S. 559.
129
 Pace, supra note 10, at 1596 -97; Welles, supra note 64, at 210.
130 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
131
 Furthermore, the Seventh Amendment may not apply in state courts. See Alexander v. Virginia, 413 U.S. 836 
(1973).
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Another empirical concern is that by allowing the PDDF to satisfy 
claims against indigent defendants, frivolous lawsuits will ensue against 
poor defendants who cannot afford to defend themselves.132
C. Effects on Settlement
If a portion of the punitive damages goes to a recipient other than 
the plaintiff, there will be an increased pressure to settle claims out of 
court.133 Normally, that would be considered a good thing,134 but in this 
case, it will result in plaintiffs recovering more than their fair share and 
defendants not facing the full social value of their torts. If the case went to 
trial, the plaintiff would receive the compensatory award plus a portion of 
the punitive award, while the plaintiff would be forced to pay the sum total 
of both the compensatory and punitive awards. However, if both the 
plaintiff and defendant estimate the awards correctly in advance, they would 
likely settle for an amount between the plaintiff’s expected recovery and the 
defendant’s expected loss, so the plaintiff will get more by settling and the 
defendant will lose less (and the state will get nothing).135 This is 
problematic because it will decrease the deterrent effect of punitive 
damages by allowing defendants to often pay less than they should be 
forced to pay. In addition, the plaintiff will still recover a windfall, albeit 
one not as large as under the current system.136 Nevertheless, the 
uncertainty inherent in the implementation of the proposal (that is, the 
uncertainty over how much the plaintiff can expect to actually receive) will 
reduce the incentive to settle by making the plaintiff’s settlement amounts 
larger as compared with the situation in states that have fixed split recovery 
statutes.
132
 For a discussion of this issue, see supra part III.B.
133 Report on Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary Damages, supra note 16, at 40; Welles, supra note 64, at 
211; cf. Breslo, supra note 16, at 1158 -64 (showing that there will be an increase in settlements if the plaintiff is 
only permitted to recover his attorney fees but no other amount from the punitive damage award).
134
 Indeed, some authorities consider it to be positive even in this case. Han, supra note 17, at 49 9-501; Stepanian, 
supra note 69, at 325 -327; cf. Dodson, supra note 112, at 1352; Grube, supra, note 112, at 875-76.
135
 For example, assume the expected compensatory award is $100,000, the expected punitive award is $200,000, 
and the expected litigation expenses (including attorney fees) to be incurred between the time of settlement and 
the end of trial are $10,000 for each party. Under the traditional scheme, the plaintiff will recover $300,000 after 
trial, for a net benefit of $290,000, while the defendant would have to pay $300,000 in damages for a net loss of 
$310,000. The parties would then typically settle for $300,000, each saving $10,000. However, under the 
proposed split-recovery scheme, assume the plaintiff only expects to recover $100,000 as the punitive award. 
Then, the plaintiff would expect a net recovery after trial of only $190,000, while the defendant’s expected net 
loss would remain at $310,000 (and the PDDF would get $100,000). The parties would then be very likely to 
settle for $250,000, because that would save each of them $60,000 (but leaving the PDDF with nothing). Thus, 
under the proposed split-recovery scheme, the pressure to settle increases and the amount of settlement decreases.
136
 Grube, supra note 112, at 875; Welles, supra note 64, at 211.
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In any case, empirical studies have shown that it is not clear that the 
availability of split recovery actually causes an increase in settlements.137 In 
addition, any problem could also be avoided by forbidding (or regulating) 
settlements in punitive damage cases; however, such solutions are typically 
not feasible.138 One partial solution, which I adopt, is to regulate settlement 
after a verdict has been reached by having the court extract a proportionate 
part of the settlement on behalf of the PDDF.139 Beyond that, any problems 
raised by settlement must simply be accepted as a necessary byproduct of 
the split-recovery plan.140
There can also be a pressure against settling. In any case in which 
the plaintiff expects to receive some money from the PDDF the plaintiff’s 
minimum settlement offer may increase to an amount larger than what the 
defendant would be held liable for (or able to pay) in court. This will 
encourage defendants to refuse to settle. However, this is a positive effect, 
because it will prevent defendants from settling for more than they should.
D. Attorney Fees
The fact that attorney fees (and other uncompensated injuries) are to 
be included under punitive rather than compensatory damages is somewhat 
strange. The proper solution would be to include all injuries (including the 
attorney fees of the prevailing party in all cases) under compensatory 
damages and assess them directly, rather than through the punitive damage 
workaround.141 This problem is largely a result of the long-standing and 
much-criticized U.S. convention of every party bearing its own litigation 
expenses.142 However, this is a political issue,143 and it is not likely to be 
changed.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although there are several minor unresolved potential concerns with 
my model statute, it is more effective at solving the problem of mismatched 
punitive damage reasons than most of the existing split recovery statutes. It 
is also superior to standard punitive damage regimes. Therefore, I urge 
legislatures to consider the model statute I have proposed. Once it is 
137
 Sharkey, supra note 40, at 444 -45.
138
 Welles, supra note 64, at 212.
139 Cf. id.
140
 Report on Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary Damages, supra note 16, at 40.
141
 Grube, supra note 112, at 852-53; Polinsky, supra note 10, at 939.
142
 Salbu, supra note 17, at 275.
143 Id. at 276.
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implemented the empirical questions will be more easily resolved, and the 
statutes will be able to be revised accordingly (if needed) to become most 
effective.
APPENDIX
Below is a model statute that incorporates the proposal suggested in the 
article.
(1) The trier of fact shall exact punitive damages from the defendant 
only:144
a. to punish the defendant or to express the abhorrence of the 
community at the defendant’s actions;
b. to sufficiently deter the defendant’s conduct when 
compensatory damages alone would be insufficient; 145
c. to account for concealable or otherwise unactionable similar 
torts;
d. to encourage tortfeasors to channel transactions through the 
market rather than through tortious acts.
(2) The trier of fact need not consider all the enumerated factors, but the 
trier of fact may consider no others.146 In a jury trial, the jury may 
not be informed of the fact that any party other than the plaintiff will 
be a recipient of the punitive damage award until after it has reached 
its verdict as to both compensatory and punitive damages.147
(3) Punitive damages shall be awarded to the plaintiff only to the extent 
that:148
144
 The statute expresses no opinion as to how the trier of fact shall reach this decision. Various alternative 
schemes should still be consistent with this statute. So even if the judge decides the final amount of the punitive 
exaction based on non-monetary values assigned by the jury to various of the enumerated factors, that would be 
consistent with this. See generally Sunstein, supra note 14, at 2112 -2121; CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE, ch. 13 (U. Chi. Press 2002).
145
 This factor is meant to include the situation in which a rich defendant’s low marginal utility of wealth is less 
than the plaintiff’s.
146
 These factors are not meant to establish guidelines for exacting punitive damages from defendants. They 
merely limit the courts to not using any other criteria besides these. However, the courts need not construe these 
criteria narrowly. For example, in assessing the community abhorrence, many additional factors will be relevant, 
including reprehensibility, the social status of the victims, etc.
147
 Not informing the jury about the recipient of the punitive damages solves two problems. First, if the jury knew 
that the plaintiff would not receive the entire punitive award, it might be tempted to increase the size of either the 
compensatory or punitive award. Cf. Robbennolt, supra note 57, at 172; Stevens, supra note 27, at 898 -99. 
Second, if the jury knew that the state (or some other worthy cause) were to be the recipient of a portion of the 
award, it might be tempted to increase the punitive damages beyond what the defendant deserves. Robbennolt, 
supra note 57, at 181 -82; Stevens, supra note 27, at 898.
148
 For example, the court might start off by including attorney’s fees (either by multiplying the hours worked by a 
reasonable fee or by taking a percentage of the compensatory award if the attorney-client contract so specifies) 
and adding to that figure all other damages not recognized by law as the basis for compensatory damages (within 
reason). The court should then determine if that figure is large enough that were the plaintiff to have expected to 
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a. the compensatory award falls short of what is necessary to 
fully compensate the plaintiff, including all expenses 
reasonably incurred in litigating the claim (including 
opportunity costs as well as attorney fees, when charged in 
good faith);
b. an additional award to the plaintiff would serve to ensure 
that the plaintiff and all other similarly situated potential 
plaintiffs had sufficient incentive to bring the claim if there 
is a public interest in such a claim being brought, taking into 
account the likelihood of success of the claim reasonably 
anticipated by the plaintiff before bringing suit as well as the 
effective value to the plaintiff of such an award;  or
c. an additional award to the plaintiff would prevent similarly 
situated potential plaintiffs from seeking extra-judicial 
remedies that would breach the peace in lieu of litigating.
(4) An additional sum from a punitive damages award may also be 
awarded to the attorneys for the plaintiffs to the extent that the 
portion of the award to which they would otherwise be entitled 
would be insufficient to induce them and other similarly situated 
attorneys to bring this claim and other similar claims in future cases
if there is a public interest in claims of this nature being brought.149
(5) Except as provided in this section and section 4, no portion of a 
punitive damage award shall be paid to the attorneys for the 
plaintiff, even if the contract between the attorneys and the plaintiffs 
specifies otherwise. Furthermore, attorneys may not seek 
contingency fees in excess of [40]% of the compensatory award in 
any case in which punitive damages are pled.150 However, the 
attorneys may be paid a reasonable hourly fee for all hours spent 
working on the punitive damages portion of the lawsuit.151
receive that much money (the compensatory award plus the above figure minus all the plaintiff’s actual costs –
that is, essentially, the compensatory award in full but no more) he would have still brought the suit rather than 
pursue some other violent extrajudicial remedy. Similarly, if the court finds that the suit served the public interest 
in some way, the court should determine if the amount is large enough that it would have encouraged the plaintiff 
sufficiently to bring the suit if he had expected this result (taking into consideration the societal value of the suit). 
If the figure does not satisfy either of these tests, it should be raised so as to satisfy both of them. 
149
 Often, particularly in civil rights cases, the attorneys take a substantial risk of non-payment in serving as 
attorneys. In order to encourage attorneys to take such cases without depriving the plaintiffs of much of their 
deserved awards, this punitive award to the attorneys may be necessary. It will often also be necessary in class-
action claims where the attorneys bear the costs of the suit and of managing the class.
150
 This sentence is necessary to prevent attorneys from claiming attorney fees so large that the effect is either that 
the entire punitive exaction is always awarded to them or that the plaintiff is not properly compensated. The figure 
of 40% might be modified slightly by legislatures enacting this model statute depending on the maximum “fair 
market” contingency rates typically charged by attorneys in the state in cases not involving punitive damages.
151
 The attorneys must be given incentive to actually try and secure punitive damages for their clients. This much 
should already be insured by the ethical duty of attorneys. However, it would be unjust to fail to compensate the 
attorneys for the time spent on punitive damages if their contingent fee comes only from the compensatory award. 
In addition, because there might be a conflict of interest between the attorneys and the plaintiffs in seeking 
Draft-5-11-04] SOLVING THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE MISMATCH 29
(6) The judge shall make the determination of how much of the punitive 
award should go to the plaintiff and the attorneys.152 If evidence as 
to the factors listed in sections 3 and 4 is needed, it shall be brought 
to the attention of the judge after the trier of fact has determined the 
amount of the punitive exaction against the defendant and after any 
motions for remittitur have been ruled upon by the trial judge.153
(7) In any case in which the punitive exaction exceeds the plaintiff’s 
itemized attorney fees154 plus $XXX,XXX155 (in today’s dollars, to 
be adjusted for inflation annually by the state treasurer and 
promulgated by the treasurer to the clerks of the various courts), if 
the punitive award to the plaintiff differs from that amount, the 
judge must state his reasons for such deviation in a written opinion, 
and he must direct the attention of the clerk of the court to such 
opinion. Similarly, if the punitive exaction is less than that amount 
and the punitive award differs from the punitive exaction, the judge 
must state his reasons in a written opinion and direct the attention of 
the clerk of the court to such opinion. The clerk of the court must 
then compile copies of all such opinions at the end of every year and 
send them to the judiciary oversight committees of the state House 
and Senate.156 Failure of any judge to state his reasons for deviating 
from these presumptive standards or to direct the attention of the 
clerk of the court to the appropriate opinions shall constitute judicial 
misconduct, to be brought to the attention of any body the law 
directs to oversee the conduct of judges. However, no judge shall be 
removed from office based on the distribution of punitive awards.157
distribution of the punitive damages (although this is unlikely), plaintiffs might hire alternative counsel to 
represent their interests in the punitive damage allocation portion of the trial. In that case, the alternative counsel 
would need to be compensated for their services.
152
 The judge makes the decision so that the reasons for decision can be studied by the legislature in reviewing the 
effect of this law in accordance with section 7.
153
 The evidence concerning distribution of the award is admitted after final decision of the award so as not to 
influence the exaction of punitive damages by any factor not found in section 1. However, even if the defendant 
plans to appeal a decision not to remit the award (or to remit it less than desired), the apportionment phase may 
continue before the appeal is heard (because the decision of the trial judge is not very likely to be disturbed on 
appeal and it is more economical for the lower court to make a final determination without waiting for the appeals 
court to respond). That will not pose a problem, because when deciding if the remittitur decision was correct, the 
appellate judges need not (and should not) examine the portion of the record dealing with the punitive 
apportionment. 
154
 The itemized attorney fees are easy to calculate directly. There is thus no need for the legislature to oversee this 
amount. However, any amount awarded to the plaintiff as a punitive award beyond the attorney fees will be more 
difficult to calculate, and this must be subject to legislative oversight.
155
 The individual legislatures enacting this model statute must determine an amount that represents a fair 
incentive to bring suit to the average plaintiff. Tentatively, I suggest a number in the ballpark of $350,000.
156
 The particular legislative committees will, of course, vary from state to state.
157
 A judge may be removed for failing to report his reasons for deviating from the presumptive allocation, but 
once he makes such a report, he cannot be removed for making a bad decision. Note that it would be considered 
judicial misconduct for a judge to fail to consider the allocation of an award altogether. This is needed to ensure 
that judges engage in the allocation proceedings even though neither party has any reason to request them.
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(8) Section 7 shall not be construed to give any body, other than an 
appellate court of competent jurisdiction, the authority to review the 
judgment of any case decided by a trial judge. However, the 
decision of the trial judge concerning the amount of the punitive 
awards to the plaintiffs and the attorneys is reviewable by an 
appellate court if such appellate court has the authority to review the 
amount of the punitive extraction and the compensatory damages.158
(9) There shall be established a fund, to be called the “Punitive Damage 
Distribution Fund” (PDDF), and an agency, to be called the 
“Punitive Damage Distribution Administration.” (PDDA). The 
PDDA shall administer the PDDF. The PDDA shall be governed by
a director,159 appointed by the chief justice of the state supreme 
court,160 to be assisted by other individuals as necessary. [Such fund 
shall be administered only using funds appropriated by the 
legislature for that purpose.]161
(10) The PDDA shall be joined as a party to any case in which a 
punitive exaction is made, after all motions for remittitur have been 
made but before the punitive awards are decided. At that point, the 
defendants may be dismissed from further proceedings in the trial 
court. A PDDA attorney shall represent the PDDA’s potential stake 
in the punitive award and he shall represent to the court that share of 
the award to which the plaintiff and the attorneys should be 
entitled.162 He shall also present evidence to support his 
representations if necessary. However, he may not present any 
evidence nor make any argument concerning the financial status of 
the PDDF. The plaintiffs and their attorneys shall also present any 
158
 In exercising this control, the legislature must be careful not to run afoul of the ruling in Ass’n of Admin. L. JJ. 
v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132 (D.D.C. 1984) (holding that an agency may not review the decisions of 
administrative law judges based purely on their allowance rates of claims), although this case is not directly
applicable.
159 A formal fund is needed because the courts will not be able to deal with the redistribution of funds in their 
normal course of operation. It would be very unlikely for a judge to be overseeing two cases simultaneously in 
one of which there is an excess of punitive damages and in the other a shortfall of the same amount. The money 
must be placed somewhere in case it is not needed right away. In addition, a specialized fund management will 
better be able to oversee distribution of funds than will a diverse collection of judges, each administering their 
own ad hoc mini-funds. 
160
 The courts appoint the director, because the fund is an agency within the judicial branch. Whether the director 
is appointed by the chief justice or by the court at large is of no consequence to the immediate discussion. So long 
as state law allows principal officers to be appointed by the courts of law, this will work. Otherwise, a different 
method of appointment may be needed.
161
 If the state cannot afford to fund the PDDA out of the budget (which should not be very burdensome, since the 
PDDA is unlikely to need more than a few lawyers, clerks, and secretaries, at an annual cost of probably less than 
$2 million per year or so, depending on the size of the state), then the enacting legislature may wish to alter this 
provision to allow the PDDA to take its operating expenses from the fund, while implementing some other 
measure to minimize the incentive to take more than the proper amount.
162
 The PDDA is not the enemy of the plaintiff. Thus, he should present to the court the fair value of the portion of 
the award he believes the plaintiff and its attorney are entitled to. He should not try to get away with as much 
money as possible, but rather with what the law dictates. Thus, in some cases the distribution will not actually be 
in dispute.
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relevant evidence if necessary. The judge shall then decide, based on 
the factors enumerated in sections 3 and 4 and the evidence 
presented, the appropriate distribution of the award.
(11) Any portion of the punitive extraction collected from the 
defendant in excess of the amounts awarded under sections 3 and 4 
(under the procedures established in section 10) shall be awarded to 
the PDDA to be placed in the PDDF.
(12) If the judge makes a punitive award to the plaintiffs and their 
attorneys that exceeds the punitive extraction from the defendants, 
then the judge shall certify such excess to the PDDA.
(13) The PDDA shall attempt to distribute to all parties brought to its 
attention under section 12 the amount certified in a timely and 
reasonable manner. However, if the PDDA is unable to satisfy all 
such claims, it shall distribute the money in a manner so as to fairly 
ensure maximum distribution (by percentage of the size of the 
award) to all claimants, without regard to the merits of the original 
claims. The PDDA shall establish procedures to comply with this 
section. A claimant who has not received the full amount certified 
by the judge may only bring an action against the PDDA if these 
policies were not followed correctly, or if the policies established 
are not consistent with this statute, the state constitution, or federal 
law.
(14) Once the trier of fact returns a finding of punitive damages, the 
parties may not settle the case without permission of the court. If the 
court allows settlement, it shall require that a portion of the 
settlement be withheld from the plaintiff and distributed to the 
PDDF. In determining what portion of the settlement shall be 
distributed to the PDDF, the court shall attempt to replicate the 
percentage of the total damages (compensatory plus punitive) that 
the PDDF would have been entitled to had the parties not settled.163
(15) If the PDDA is able to satisfy all claims in their entirety certified 
to it under section 12, then it may, at its discretion, award money to 
tort plaintiffs who have not been able to collect full judgments from 
defendants due to inability to pay.164 If the PDDA decides to offer 
163
 This section is needed to discourage parties from settling cases with an intent to evade the allocation of 
punitive damages. Otherwise, once it becomes clear that punitive damages will be awarded, plaintiffs will settle 
for any amount larger than the compensatory damages plus their expected punitive award and defendants will 
settle for any amount less than the compensatory damages plus the punitive extraction. This will result in an 
under-deterred defendant and an overcompensated plaintiff. This fear becomes more pronounced once the 
punitive damages are determined, because that finding eliminates much of the uncertainty.
164
 Ideally the PDDA will be able to distribute funds to plaintiffs regardless of whether they requested punitive 
damages. If, however, the PDDA finds it necessary to provide attorneys to defendants in cases involving punitive 
damages, then it will likely have to limit payments under this section to plaintiffs who requested punitive damages 
(to prevent plaintiffs from suing poor people and purposely not requesting punitive damages so that the poor will 
not be entitled to a lawyer).
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such awards, it shall establish procedures to ensure fair distribution. 
It shall also keep public records of all such awards so as to prevent 
plaintiffs from seeking payment from defendants if already fully 
compensated by the PDDF.
(16) A judge may, in his discretion or upon a special finding of the 
jury, make a determination of punitive awards in accordance with 
sections 3 and 4 even if no punitive extraction is made. The judge 
shall then certify such amount to the PDDA, making explicit note of 
the portion due to attorney fees.165 The judge may also certify to the 
PDDA a claim for attorney fees brought by any prevailing defendant 
in a tort case if the law does not otherwise assess those fees against 
the plaintiff.166
(17) Claims certified to the PDDF under section 16 shall be treated 
exactly like claims for unpaid damages under section 15.
(18) It shall be a criminal offense to sue a defendant in tort when the 
claim is without merit and the plaintiff knows (or has good reason to 
believe) that the defendant is so poor that he may not have the 
resources to defend against the claim or to pay the judgment 
rendered against him. This crime shall be punishable by not less 
than 1 year nor more than 5 years in prison.167
(19) If the PDDA determines that too many claims are being brought 
against indigent defendants due to the promise of a PDDF 
distribution under section 15, then the PDDA shall provide attorneys 
(or the funds to hire attorneys, taken from the PDDF) to all indigent 
defendants being sued for punitive damages.
165
 This requirement will allow the PDDA to pay claims for attorney fees before inducement claims if there is not 
enough money to satisfy all the claims.
166
 Without this provision, plaintiffs would be at a distinct advantage over defendants. See Breslo, supra note 16, 
at 1136.
167
 This provision will counter the chance that plaintiffs will bring frivolous lawsuits against indigent defendants, 
motivated by the completion of unpaid judgments by the PDDF in section 15.
